In 1982, the US Army began its renaissance of the operational level of war with the publication of a revised Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations. The rediscovery of this level and the subsequent experimentation with it strained the very limits of the Army's command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) systems. Virtually all branches in the Army felt the changes brought on by FM 100-5, especially in the areas of firepower, mobility, and protection. Commanders had to view military operations from a broader perspective and act accordingly. The significant impact of the operational level of war has been in organizational changes, new concepts, and dynamic operations. The effect of these changes on C3I are reviewed and assessed in this monograph. The first topic reviewed is the Army's concept of operational level warfare. Next, the theoretical and doctrinal bases of the Army's C3I systems are examined. Finally, the requirements for C3I at the operational level are presented and conclusions drawn. The conclusions are divided into four separate categories, one for each element of C3I. Among the several findings of this research, it is the view that the Army's C3I doctrine fails to address the needs of all four elements equally. There is a decided bias towards technological solutions to problems that do not respond to such corrective measures. This bias has favored the communications element over the other three and has resulted in Army commanders being provided with one of the best tactical communications systems in the world. However, such systems cannot redress faulty command styles, disjointed control measures, or inadequate intelligence. All four elements must work in concert with one another for the operational commander to plan and conduct effective campaigns. | Mercury's Dilemma by Paul D Hughes, Paperback | Indigo Chapters